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SUMMARY
In 18 weeks, Health Protection Scotland (HPS) deployed a syndromic surveillance system to
early-detect natural or intentional disease outbreaks during the G8 Summit 2005 at Gleneagles,
Scotland. The system integrated clinical and non-clinical datasets. Clinical datasets included
Accident & Emergency (A&E) syndromes, and General Practice (GPs) codes grouped into
syndromes. Non-clinical data included telephone calls to a nurse helpline, laboratory test orders,
and hotel staﬀ absenteeism. A cumulative sum-based detection algorithm and a log-linear
regression model identiﬁed signals in the data. The system had a fax-based track for real-time
identiﬁcation of unusual presentations. Ninety-ﬁve signals were triggered by the detection
algorithms and four forms were faxed to HPS. Thirteen signals were investigated. The system
successfully complemented a traditional surveillance system in identifying a small cluster of
gastroenteritis among the police force and triggered interventions to prevent further cases.
INTRODUCTION
With the emergence of the severe acute respiratory
syndrome (SARS) and avian inﬂuenza in Asia, and
the increased threats of terrorism in Europe and
United States, the need for strategies to detect
and respond rapidly to biological and chemical dis-
asters has taken new urgency. Scotland experienced
large-scale outbreaks from 1998 to 2002, such as a
large outbreak of Escherichia coli O157 (VTEC) due
to contaminated food, an outbreak of Clostridium
novyi among injecting drug users, and an outbreak of
cryptosporidium due to contaminated water supplies
[1–3]. Preparedness for these types of incidents is
crucial, especially during high-proﬁle events such as
the G8 Summit, a meeting of the leaders of eight
major world economies, and its related events – anti-
globalization demonstrations and life concerts – that
attract hundreds of thousands of people into cities
nearby the Summit venue.
Public health agencies in the United States, Europe,
Australia and Japan implemented innovative surveil-
lance methods for high-proﬁle events in order to
early-detect a covert bioterrorism attack or a natural
outbreak of infectious diseases [4–7]. Referred to as
syndromic surveillance, these new systems can po-
tentially identify disease clusters before conventional
surveillance methods.
Health Protection Scotland (HPS) was able to es-
tablish a multi-source syndromic surveillance system
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in 18 weeks time for deployment to rapidly detect
outbreaks, including chemical and bioterrorism at-
tacks, during a 2-week period (4–15 July) around the
G8 Summit at Gleneagles, 6–8 July, in Scotland. A
multi-source system, which compares information
derived from several data sources, some of which are
more sensitive than others, can assess whether or not
a trend observed in any single data source is con-
ﬁrmed by the other data sources and identify simul-
taneous and unexpected but concordant variations in
datasets that may suggest an actual disease outbreak
[8]. This paper describes the methodology, challenges
and results of implementing a multi-source syndromic
surveillance system for a high-proﬁle event.
METHODS
Surveillance system objective
The objective of the syndromic surveillance system
was to ensure early recognition of disease outbreaks,
whether natural or intentional, in areas surrounding
the G8 Summit venue and the delegates’ hotels, and in
the nearby areas where demonstrations were planned,
in order to provide rapid public health follow-up and
control of outbreaks.
Surveillance period
The system operated over a 12-day period (4–15 July
2005), starting 2 days before the Summit, to test the
system, and ﬁnishing 7 days after the Summit, to
cover the peak risk period for bioterrorism-related
agents without making excessive demands on the data
providers.
System operation
Sites and data sources
The system integrated non-speciﬁc health information
from multiple data sources, located near or at the
Summit venue (Fig. 1). Data were captured on coded
discharge diagnoses from two General Practice (GP)
medical surgeries and from the on-site clinic at the
Summit venue; coded triage diagnoses from two
Data sources
4 GP
practices
1 On-site
clinic
1 Hotel occ.
health
services
NHS health
boards
Scottish
Dept. of Health
Data analysis
& visualization
HPS
analystsData receipt &processing
5 A&Es
'NHS 24'
3 Laboratories
Daily summary
reports
Gp:
General medical practitioners
NHS 24:
National telephone helpline
for health advice
Hotel occ. health services:
Hotel occupational health services
A&Es:
Hospital accident and
emergency departments
Gleneagles
Mallaig
Inverness NHS 24
Covers all scotland
Aberdeen
Crieff (GP)
Dunblane (GP)
Stirling (A&E, Lab)
Glasgow Edinburgh
Dunfermline (A&E)
Kirkcaldy (A&E)
Perth (A&E, Lab)
Dundee (A&E, Lab)
Gleneagles
GP & on-site hotel clinic
& occupational health 
Oban
Electronic track
Fax-based track
Data interpretation &
summary reports
Fig. 1. Data sources and ﬂowchart of information of the multi source surveillance system, 4 15 July 2005, Scotland.
Accident & Emergency (A&E) departments ; daily
counts of microbiological specimens submitted to
three laboratories, and staﬀ absenteeism from
the hotel occupational health services at Gleneagles.
NHS Scotland operates a nurse-led telephone hot-
line for health advice and patient referral, ‘NHS 24’
(http://www.nhs24.com/html/content/default.asp),
similar to NHS Direct (http://www.nhsdirect.nhs.uk/)
in England and Wales. NHS 24 is highly integrated
into primary medical care in Scotland, and therefore
our system included daily NHS 24 call data.
Concurrently with the electronic system, each par-
ticipating site and six additional clinical sites – three
GP and three A&E – were enrolled to use a fax-based
system, adapted from a system used by the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), USA during
large public events, to provide immediate warnings to
HPS of severe and unexplained illnesses in presenting
individuals [4].
Figure 1 shows the eight towns [Auchterarder
(Gleneagles), Crieﬀ, Dunblane, Stirling, Dundee,
Perth, Kirkcaldy, and Dunfermline] covered by the
A&E, GP and Laboratory components of the sur-
veillance system (combined population 623 200). The
NHS 24 component covers 5.5 million people, namely
all of Scotland. The A&E departments were main re-
ferral hospitals, with each on average encountering
25 000–50 000 annual acute care visits. The three
microbiology laboratories were attached to the
referral hospitals. Each GP included in the system has
on average 800 weekly contacts with patients. NHS 24
receives a daily average of 2400 calls.
Syndrome deﬁnitions
The bioterrorism agents that the syndromic surveil-
lance was designed to detect included anthrax, plague,
smallpox, botulism, viral haemorrhagic fevers and
tularaemia. The system was also designed to pick up
symptoms related to common infectious diseases (e.g.
norovirus) and unusual ones (e.g. avian inﬂuenza and
SARS).
We converted patients’ symptoms and NHS 24
hotline calls into syndromes (Table 1). We monitored
the daily number of orders for 12 categories of
microbiology laboratory tests that were entered
daily into laboratory databases. Syndromes and their
deﬁnitions diﬀered between data sites, as data pro-
viders operated diﬀerent types of electronic infor-
mation systems, and it was not possible to extract the
same type of data from all the systems. Syndromes
were monitored among persons of all ages. For the
GPs, we used the syndrome categories and deﬁnitions
developed by CDC and the USA Department of
Defence Global Emerging Infections System [9]. The
standardized terminology used by participating GPs
was Read Codes to specify the syndromes [10]. The
A&E nurses used the Manchester Triage System to
identify patients’ chief complaints [11]. They chose one
of 52 ﬂow-charts to conduct a structured interview
with patients presenting at A&E and then assigned a
Table 1. Syndromes by electronic data source and laboratory test orders used in the syndromic surveillance
system, 4–15 July 2005, Scotland
NHS 24*
(call type)
GPs# (discharge
diagnoses)
A&Es$
(chief complaints)
Laboratories (orders for
microbiology tests)
Colds/Flu Respiratory Shortness of breath Blood culture
Diﬃculty breathing Gastrointestinal Unwell adult Stool samples
Cough Neurological Collapsed adult Wound swabs
Diarrhoea Botulism like Diarrhoea Skin swabs
Vomiting Haemorrhagic illness Abdominal pain Throat swabs
Double vision Rash Gastrointestinal bleeding Naso pharyngeal aspirate
Eye problems Localized cutaneous lesions Headache Sputum samples
Rash Lymphadenitis Rashes Eye, ear swabs
Fever Fever Exposure to chemicals Urine culture
Lumps Speciﬁc infection Serology
Severe illness or death due
to infection
Mycology
Mycoplasma IgM
* NHS 24 is a national telephone helpline for health advice and patients’ referral.
# General medical practitioners.
$ Hospital accident and emergency departments.
triage level from 1 (immediate care needed) to 5 (care
within 4 hours). NHS 24 nurses used clinical decision
support software to respond and triage calls.
When a person described multiple symptoms, NHS
24 or A&E staﬀ used detailed guidelines to choose
the major symptom, and the person was categorized
into only one syndrome. At GP surgeries and
laboratories, a person with multiple symptoms was
matched up with several syndromes. Multiple visits
by an individual patient due to the same episode
of illness might have been grouped several times
into the same or into diﬀerent syndromes. Automated
assignment to syndromes, using automated queries in
each provider’s electronic databases, was done locally
by data providers for NHS 24, laboratory data, and
A&E; and centrally by HPS for GP data.
Data transfer and processing
Every afternoon and 7 days per week, the data
providers transmitted data ﬁles containing non-
identiﬁable patient data to HPS. A coordinator at
each data site was responsible for ensuring accu-
racy and completeness of the data ﬁles. If a ﬁle
was not received by 17:00 hours, we contacted the
local coordinator to obtain the data. The data was
held in line with the guidance in the Conﬁdentiality
and Security Advisory Group for Scotland report
[12]. Each afternoon, we received the ﬁles and moni-
tored them for daily data completeness, as the per-
centage of data sources emailing us the complete ﬁles
within the appropriate interval of submission. Finally,
we copied them for analysis in data provider-speciﬁc
Microsoft Oﬃce Excel ﬁles (Microsoft Corp.,
Washington, USA).
Daily ﬁles covered the previous day’s data
(midnight-to-midnight to ﬁt in with the providers’
own workﬂows) and contained the following infor-
mation about patients : date and time of visit, age in
years, sex, home postcode sector, disposition, and the
syndromes of interest.
For the fax-based system, the data providers were
asked to fax a form within 2 hours of seeing a patient
with an exceptional or unusual clinical presentation
to HPS and to phone promptly a 24-hour hotline to
inform HPS that a fax was sent. The surveillance form
contained similar data elements to the electronic ﬁles.
Data analysis and statistical methods
We analysed historical data by syndrome and data
provider, to estimate the baseline number of each
syndrome expected on each day from each provider.
The amount of historical data available for each
provider was: 2 months and 6 months for the two GP
surgeries ; 3 months, 3 months, and 8 months for the
three laboratories ; 1 month for the two A&E depart-
ments ; and 12 months for NHS 24. Since the surveil-
lance system was only operational for 12 days, and
had a dedicated team of analysts and public health
experts we implemented statistical detection methods
with parameters set such that the sensitivity was more
important than the speciﬁcity (i.e. a high false-positive
rate was acceptable).
The ﬁrst method, the Poisson cumulative sum-
based (CUSUM) method, was applied to all the
datasets, and was intended to detect a slowly building
rise. We used a Poisson CUSUM with time-varying
expectations to allow the daily counts to be diﬀerent
on weekends [13, 14]. A ‘signal ’ was triggered in the
system, when the cumulated diﬀerences in observed
and expected counts exceeded a predetermined
threshold. The parameters of the CUSUM were set
such that the time between false alarms (ARL0) for
any one CUSUM was 400 days. The high number of
syndromes and data providers meant that we ran 102
daily CUSUMs, leading to a high number of false
alarms. Statistical analyses were carried out using
STATA version 7 (Stata Corp., College Station, TX,
USA), including our own program to calculate the
Poisson CUSUM.
The second method, a version of the Exceedance
Method by Farrington (FARR), was applied to all
the datasets, and was intended to detect an acute
and localized increase of syndrome counts [15]. The
original Exceedance Method was devised for weekly
organism counts and the expected counts for week
i in year j were obtained from a Poisson regression
model ﬁtted to data from weeks (i – 3), (i – 2), (i – 1),
i, (i+1), (i+2), (i+3) in the previous 5 years, years
j – 1, j – 2, j – 3, j – 4, j – 5. The regression model
had linear terms for week and year. In our case we did
not have historical data and so had to modify
the method. Daily expected syndrome counts were
calculated using an over-dispersed Poisson regression
model incorporating a term to diﬀerentiate weekend
days from weekdays. For FARR, we used three
diﬀerent moving baseline periods to ﬁt the models :
the previous 7 days, days 3–9 in the past, and days
3–30 in the past, i.e. the previous 4 weeks. The ﬁrst
two corresponded to C1 and C2 reference periods of
Hutwagner et al. detection algorithms [16]. Each of
these moving baseline periods provided the data
points (7, 7 and 28, respectively) with which to
estimate the parameters of the model, yi=m+bwi,
where yi is the observed syndrome count in day
i of the moving baseline period, wi, is an indicator
diﬀerentiating weekdays from weekends, and m, b are
the weekday average parameter and weekend in-
crement parameter, respectively. yi was assumed to
follow an over-dispersed Poisson distribution. The
moving baseline periods were chosen to respond
to potentially diﬀerent recent trends during the sur-
veillance period. A ‘signal ’ in the system was deﬁned
as a statistically signiﬁcant increase, at the 5% sig-
niﬁcance level, in observed syndrome counts in excess
of expected syndrome counts. Statistical analyses
were carried out using R (http://www.r-project.org/).
Every day, we produced summary graphs for indi-
vidual syndromes by data provider and by detection
method, and a list of signals triggered by the three
methods.
Investigations
Every day each signal was assessed using a decision
algorithm, adapted from a phased approach derived
from CDC, to determine whether to proceed with
more advanced investigations of signals (Fig. 2) [17].
This entailed data validation, including checking for
coding errors ; identifying if the signal was reﬂected in
other data sources ; estimating the number of cases
involved in the signal ; and characterizing the cases
according to person, place, and time. If consequently,
we suspected a true disease cluster, we contacted the
data providers or the local public health authorities
(LHA) to obtain additional clinical and epidemi-
ological information about the cases. If needed, we
liaised with the LHA to mount local investigations,
such as on-site reviews of patients’ records and/or full
epidemiological investigations of cases.
We determined the predictive value positive (PVP)
of the surveillance system by identifying the pro-
portion of signals triggered by the system and fully
investigated by us, that represented true disease clus-
ters.
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Fig. 2. Decision algorithm of the multi source surveillance system, 4 15 July 2005, Scotland. LHA, Local public health
authorities.
password-protected web interface to data providers,
local and national health authorities. Subsequently,
we compiled a daily situation report, which was
emailed to the same colleagues and was discussed
daily at a teleconference between HPS and the health
authorities. The LHA prepared reports on local epi-
demiological investigations.
Response preparedness
One month before the Summit, the LHA and HPS
devised and tested a tabletop exercise for the rapid
deployment of a coordinated and eﬀective response
for health protection emergencies during the Summit.
HPS also conducted refresher training for clinicians
and other ﬁrst responders in recognizing and manag-
ing diseases due to the exposure of chemical, biologi-
cal and other infectious disease agents ; and training
for LHA on investigating and responding to unusual
outbreaks.
Human resources
Six and half full-time staﬀ were involved in the 2-week
operation of the system: one consultant epidemi-
ologist, two epidemiologists, one data manager,
two statisticians, and one administrative staﬀ. We
relied upon the LHA to carry out local investigations.
Every data provider nominated a data coordinator.
RESULTS
The PVP of the surveillance system was 8% (1/13) by
including fully investigated signals into the analysis.
No disease cluster of public health importance was
detected outside of the system.
For GPs and laboratories, the daily data com-
pleteness during the surveillance period was 100%.
The A&E departments and NHS 24 failed to transmit
data on the last surveillance day and the laboratories
had daily backlogs of 3–4 days.
During the 12-day surveillance period, we analysed
data that ﬁtted the deﬁnitions of the pre-deﬁned
syndromes – 225 A&E visits, 188 GP visits, 2566
orders for microbiology tests, and 23193 telephone
calls for health advice. Ninety-ﬁve signals were trig-
gered by CUSUM and FARR. Guided by our de-
cision algorithm, we investigated only 13 of the 95
signals (Table 2). The data source NHS 24 triggered
most signals, 51 of 95, accounting for 49% of
the 79 signals produced by FARR, and 75% of the
16 signals produced by CUSUM. According to our
decision algorithm, we investigated three of the
FARR NHS 24 signals. We did not identify any dis-
ease cluster of public health importance. Nonetheless,
for 7 days NHS 24 continuously triggered a signal
(CUSUM) for the syndrome ‘Eye Problems’, which
truly reﬂected the problem of hay fever conjunctivitis
in the community.
On six occasions, the same types of signals were
conﬁrmed in several data sources. There was no clus-
tering by person and place and no other traditional
surveillance system was alerting us at the same time.
Five signals related to the syndrome ‘Rash’ were
due to syndrome misclassiﬁcations. Two signals
were further investigated, because they reﬂected a
rise of a severe syndrome ‘Unwell adult/Immediate
care needed’. No disease cluster was identiﬁed.
Many cases presenting with non-communicable dis-
eases at A&E departments were classiﬁed into
the category ‘Unwell adult ’ because of its unspeciﬁc
nature.
On 7 July, we identiﬁed a true disease cluster by a
signal triggered by ‘A&E Perth’. This data source
triggered in total 4% of the 95 signals, and all were
identiﬁed by FARR. We investigated two of them,
mainly because one signal was triggered by both the
fax and the electronic tracks and the other signal
included severe cases admitted to the hospital. The
local investigation revealed a true cluster of gastro-
enteritis among three police and one security oﬃcer
at the Summit venue (Fig. 3). Our system was not the
ﬁrst one to detect the cluster. Nine hours before, an
astute clinician at the hotel clinic phoned the on-call
LHA to inform them about the cases. At the same
time, the clinician used the fax-based track of our
system to warn us about the cases ; however, he
neglected to phone the 24-hour hotline to inform us
about the incoming fax. As it was night-time, there
was nobody in HPS to receive the fax. Next morning,
we acknowledged the fax and contacted the LHA to
learn that they were already aware of the problem.
The LHA and the police investigated the cases locally
and implemented control measures. Our system pro-
vided the opportunity for additional case ﬁnding
through rapid access to information about gastro-
enteritis presentations from multiple data sources.
Our system, the LHA, and the police did not identify
additional cases during the following days. We were
reassured that the outbreak was not due to a deliber-
ate release.
DISCUSSION
Our surveillance system detected a cluster of gastro-
enteritis in police and security oﬃcers. Although the
disease cluster was initially detected by a traditional
surveillance system, our syndromic surveillance sys-
tem complemented the traditional approach by rap-
idly uncovering the scope of the outbreak. This
provided evidence that the outbreak was not due to a
deliberate release. Similarly, the New York City
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (NYC/
DOHMH) syndromic surveillance system proved to
be most useful at enhancing traditional disease re-
porting in providing information on the pace and
magnitude of city-wide outbreaks [18]. In our case,
the rapid detection of the scope and nature of the
outbreak was imperative as the same day we dis-
covered the cluster of gastroenteritis, 7 July, terrorist
bombings occurred in London. As a consequence, it
was perceived that the G8 Summit venue may have
been faced with a high threat of terrorist attack.
Only FARR detected the acute rise of syndrome
counts related to a true cluster of gastroenteritis, be-
cause it performs well at identifying acute and local-
ized outbreaks [15]. The CUSUM performs well at
detecting slowly emerging and widespread rises, and it
detected the outbreak of hay fever conjunctivitis in
the community in Scotland [19]. The use of two
complementary surveillance methods, CUSUM and
FARR was justiﬁed as neither one would have ident-
iﬁed both situations. Rolfhamre showed that stat-
istical algorithm performance varies according to
outbreak shape, duration, and size [20]. Indeed, we
expect syndromic surveillance systems to detect a high
diversity of threats, both natural and deliberate,
however, it is less likely that one algorithm will be able
to detect all of them.
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Fig. 3. Signals triggered by the Farrington detection algor
ithm for the syndrome ‘Severe Abdominal Pain’ at the
Accident and Emergency department in Perth. Observed
counts for the syndrome ‘Severe Abdominal Pain’ ( )
crossed the statistical detection threshold ( ) on 7 July
2006; . . . . ., expected syndrome counts. This signal reﬂected
a true cluster of gastroenteritis in police and security oﬃcers
at the Summit venue. The signal on 10 July was a false
alarm.
Table 2. Number of signals by data source and detection algorithm, investigated during the surveillance period,
4–15 July 2005, Scotland
Data sources
No. of
signals
No. of signals by
detection algorithm
No. of signals
investigated ResultsFARR* CUSUM#
NHS 24$ 51 39 12 3 No cluster identiﬁed
GP· 19 19 0 7 No cluster identiﬁed
Laboratory" 13 10 3 0
A&Ek 12 11 1 3 Dundee : No cluster identiﬁed, but one
true cluster of gastroenteritis in police
oﬃcers identiﬁed
Perth : One signal investigated
which turned out not to be a true
disease cluster
Total 95 79 16 13 One cluster identiﬁed
* Exceedance method by Farrington.
# Cumulative sum method.
$ NHS 24 is a national telephone helpline for health advice and patients’ referral.
· Combined ﬁndings from the general medical practitioners in Auchterarder and in Dunblane.
" Combined ﬁndings from the microbiology laboratories in Dundee, Stirling, and Perth.
k Combined ﬁndings from the hospital accident and emergency departments in Perth and Dundee.
The PVP of the system was low, as we deliberately
lowered speciﬁcity in order to improve the sensitivity
of the system. The cost of not detecting a chemical or
bioterrorism event or a naturally occurring outbreak
would have been enormous. Consequently, the level
of false alarms was acceptable, as we wanted to be
reassured that no outbreak was occurring when the
system did not yield a signal. We thought that we
had suﬃcient resources at our disposal to detect and
investigate signals. The system provided a real sense
of security that an intentional release of biological
or chemical agents would be rapidly discovered.
Similarly, it is mentioned in CDC’s Framework for
Evaluating Public Health Surveillance Systems that as
long as the likelihood of terrorism is low, PVP will
remain near zero. The PVP and the sensitivity for
these surveillance systems need to be calibrated in
each system to balance the beneﬁts of early detection
of outbreaks with the locally acceptable level of false
alarm [21].
In our system, A&E data triggered few false alarms
and identiﬁed a true cluster of gastroenteritis. A&E
data have been shown in other surveillance systems to
be useful for the early detection of outbreaks [4, 22,
23]. We may have increased the PVP of A&E depart-
ments by combining chief complaints with discharge
diagnoses for each patient, however, such information
might have been less timely. The investigations of
A&E signals were the most resource intensive, as each
time a physician of the LHA had to travel to the A&E
to check the medical records of the relevant patients,
before providing feedback to us. A standardized
medical record extract form would have been a useful
tool for the investigations. Another problem was that
LHA had insuﬃcient personnel to carry out follow-
ups of cases with no deﬁned diagnosis, who were ad-
mitted into hospital. Likewise, Steiner-Sichel et al.
reported that sometimes the time required to conduct
investigations in the NYC/DOHMH system and re-
trieve diagnostic and epidemiological information
negated the advantage of timely data acquisition [18].
Next time, a LHA may ask a neighbouring LHA as
part of a formal cooperation and assistance request to
provide personnel to help with the follow-up of the
cases in the hospitals.
NHS 24 provided the largest amount of historical
data to build our prediction models. It was well in-
tegrated into the primary care services in Scotland
and hence it provided a large coverage of the Scottish
population. A syndromic surveillance system based
on NHS Direct call data has been in operation in
England and Wales since 2001. An evaluation of the
system in 2005 showed that it was timely, representa-
tive, useful, and acceptable with a low marginal cost
[8]. Our NHS 24 data triggered many signals, three of
which were investigated, but none were considered
events of public health importance. The detection al-
gorithms may be too sensitive for this data source, the
data may not contain suﬃcient signal, or the spatial
resolution (i.e. NHS 24 call centre) of our analyses
was not ﬁne enough. Another problem could have
been that signs and symptoms related to a disease
might not have been correctly assigned to the proper
syndrome group. However, this could have been the
case for every data source, as we did not have enough
time to validate the syndrome categories by data
source in our surveillance population. A data vali-
dation exercise would also have been useful in pro-
viding us with a better understanding of the data
patterns, which assists signal investigations. We were
able to rapidly deploy the system, because we used
existing electronic health information systems; there-
by we did not disrupt routine work of the data pro-
viders and we did not have to invest major resources
into the set up of the system. However the running of
the system, especially the local investigation of A&E
signals may have beneﬁted from additional resources
and personnel to increase the timeliness of the in-
vestigations and to prevent disruption of day-to-day
work of the LHA and the A&E staﬀ. More prep-
aration time would have provided us with suﬃcient
time to validate the syndromes by data source, to in-
volve the data providers and the LHA at an earlier
stage of the project and better understand their ex-
pectations of the system. Hopefully this would also
have led to less data delays and incompleteness during
the set-up and the surveillance period.
CONCLUSIONS
The terrorist attacks on 7 July in London underlined
the threat of terrorist attacks related to high-proﬁle
events. A syndromic surveillance system to rapidly
detect an intentional or natural release of biological
or chemical agents was implemented to improve the
security of the delegates and the public during the G8
Summit 2005 in Scotland. The surveillance system
was set up in a short time-scale, and successfully used
multiple data sources and two diﬀerent statistical
algorithms to augment the capabilities of an alert
frontline clinician at identifying a cluster of gastro-
enteritis among the police force. The system triggered
interventions to prevent further cases. The local in-
vestigations of A&E signals were resource-intensive
and more personnel and resources were needed as
anticipated for the investigation of these signals.
More preparation time for the set-up of the system, at
least 1 year before the event, is important to consoli-
date good relationships with the data providers and
the LHA and increase their ownership of the project,
which is essential for a smooth and eﬃcient set-up and
operation of the system.
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